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OVERCOMING LEGAL BARRIERS TO THE
TRANSFER OF THIRD-PARTY TORT
CLAIMS AS A MEANS OF
FINANCING FIRST-PARTY
NO-FAULT INSURANCE*
JEFFREY O'CONNELL**
JANET BECK***
Editor's Note: In an earlier article in this publication, the senior author
proposed a system offinancingflrst-party nofault insurance, in whole or in
part, through the transfer of insureds' third-party tort claims to no-fault in-
surers.1 Part I of this article briefly outlines that proposal Part II then
explains how "approval offirst-party no-fault contract would be consistent
with a long history of judicial efforts to free the law from restraints on the
transfer of interests in personal injury tort claims."2
I. THE PROPOSAL
"First-party insurance is coverage under which the policy-holder col-
lects payments for his losses from his own insurance company rather
than from the insurer of the other person who caused the accident. The
latter is known as third-party insurance: the prototypical example be-
ing tort liability insurance.3
"Elective first-party no-fault insurance might work like this: An in-
surer could offer no-fault coverages in increments of $10,000, up to any
amount, payable for economic loss consisting principally of medical
expenses (including rehabilitation) and wage loss stemming from per-
* © Copyright 1979, Jeffrey O'Connell. The senior author acknowledges his deep gratitude
to the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. This article, a sequel to that published in
1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 693, was completed during the author's tenure as a Guggenheim Fellow,
1979-80.
** Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A., 1951, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1954,
Harvard University.
*** Member, Illinois Bar. B.A., 1972, Vassar College; J.D., 1979, University of Illinois.
1, O'Connell, Harnessing the Liability Lottery: Elective First-Party No-Fault Insurance Fi-
nanced by Third-Party Tort Claims, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 693, adaptedfrom J. O'CONNELL, THE
LAwsurr LottERY (1979).
2. Id. at 712.
3. Id. at 697.
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sonal injury or death. In return, the insurer would receive an absolute
assignment of the insured's tort claim (for both economic and
noneconomic loss) against third-parties causing injury or death. The
insurer would then use the recoveries on those tort claims to help pay
no-fault benefits to all insureds. To prevent adverse selection, the par-
ties [arguably, at least) would have to transfer the tort claim prior to
any injury, ie., at the time the agreement for future payment of no-
fault benefits is consummated. Otherwise, if a victim could choose af-
ter an accident whether to press a fault-based or a no-fault claim, those
with valid fault-based claims [might conceivably) press them while
others would collect no-fault benefits, leaving an insurer without fault-
based claims to provide income to pay no-fault benefits.4
"The no-fault insurer would agree that upon injury to a no-fault in-
sured the no-fault insurer would pay no-fault benefits periodically as
economic losses accrue. Furthermore, the insurer would agree to pay
the injured insured the equivalent of any amount, in excess of the no-
fault benefits, recovered as economic losses in the tort action against
third-parties without reduction for expenses incurred in recovering.
This device guarantees that the insured will receive whatever level of
no-fault benefits he wishes to purchase plus whatever amount of eco-
nomic loss in excess of that limit he is eligible to recover in tort. But he
would have assigned to the no-fault insurer any tort right that had ac-
crued to him as a result of the injury.5
"Note the advantages to a no-fault insured under first-party no-fault
insurance. He is assured of automatic payment of economic loss at
whatever level he chooses in the event of accidental personal injury and
of payment of whatever tort damages he would have received for his
economic loss without the necessity of incurring attorneys' fees or other
litigation expenses for either no-fault or fault-based payment. His net
payment, therefore, will often be almost as great as, and sometimes
greater than, the payment he would have received at common law,
while suffering much less uncertainty and anxiety... . If A had a
valid tort claim against C and recovered his entire loss of $55,000
($30,000 economic loss plus $25,000 noneconomic loss), he would nor-
mally pay at least one-third to a lawyer (or $18,333), leaving him with a
net of $36,667. Under the elective first-party no-fault plan he receives a
net of $30,000 with $10,000 (the amount he chose) payable automati-
4. Id. at 697-98 (footnotes omitted). But see notes 14-15 infra and accompanying text.
5. O'Connell, supra note 1, at 698 (footnotes omitted).
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cally without the uncertainty and angst of tort litigation. Assuming liti-
gation expenses of fifty percent, A would have received net payment of
$27,500 from tort liability insurance versus $30,000 under elective first-
party no-fault insurance.6
"Admittedly, the no-fault insurer and the insurer of the third-party
who injured the no-fault insured would still have to settle the complex
questions of fault and the value of pain and suffering. But those issues
would now arise between two insurance companies, who would in all
likelihood settle the matter expeditiously by informal means and with-
out the expensive litigation that now occurs with many intercompany
claims. And regardless of whether litigation results, an insurance com-
pany would not pay its lawyer a third or more of any recovery, as indi-
vidual injury victims must do. Casualty insurance companies instead
pay their lawyers the same way they pay their salaried executives-
well, but not well enough to make them quick millionaires.7
"This plan for no-fault benefits will not be mandatory. Rather, it
will be elective, allowing, but not compelling, any insurer to offer it by
contract and similarly allowing any potential accident victim to refuse
it. Given the apparent public preference, evidenced by many polls, for
certainty of payment versus the gamble of a lawsuit, one can expect
widespread acceptance of no-fault. Thus an automobile insurer could
offer no-fault insurance benefits for accidents to insureds in states with-
out, or with inadequate, no-fault automobile insurance laws. Workers'
compensation insurers could offer employees-pursuant to collective
bargaining-benefits supplementing inadequate workers' compensa-
tion benefits for all injuries in the course of employment and no-fault
benefits to employees and their families for off-the-job accidents.
Health and disability insurers, either writing individual or group poli-
cies, or casualty companies writing homeowners' coverage, could offer
no-fault coverage for all kinds of accidents. Professional trade associa-
tions could offer similar coverage to their members.8
'This plan for elective no-fault insurance permits the insurance in-
dustry to harness liability insurance both for its own and the public's
advantage. Insurers seem almost panicked over current trends in per-
sonal injury liability and their inability to control them through legisla-
tion or otherwise. But far from requiring vast, revolutionary and
unpredictable changes dictated by often hostile or uninformed legisla-
6. Id. at 702-03 (footnotes omitted).
7. Id. at 703 (footnotes omitted).
8. Id. at 705-06 (footnotes omitted).
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tures, elective contracts for no-fault insurance with a corresponding
purchase of the payees' fault-based claims need not await statutory au-
thorization. Further, the insurance industry can structure these con-
tracts itself subject, of course, to input in the public interest through
regulatory approval by insurance commissioners." 9
II. OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL
A. Insurance Industry Resistance
In a way it is curious that the casualty insurance industry persists in
concentrating its efforts on coverage that focuses on the least important
part of the risks its customers face from accidents-namely, its custom-
ers' liability to others rather than its customers' own losses. If the typi-
cal insurance customer were asked what financial fear looms largest
from accidents, the answer clearly would be the fear of unreimbursed
medical expenses and wage losses for himself and his family members,
not his tort liability to third parties. Yet, with the exception of almost
derisory amounts of medical payments coverage under auto insurance,
casualty insurers ignore those losses most important to their insureds."°
If casualty insurers offer no-fault collision coverage for losses to
one's car, along with liability coverage for damages to another's car,
why not do the same for the even more important losses to persons? It
might be answered that first-party coverage-namely, health and disa-
bility insurance-is available from other kinds of insurers to protect
against such loss. But the one point brought home dramatically by all
studies in this area is the degree to which most Americans are inade-
quately covered for catastrophic accidental loss. According to a 1970
Department of Transportation study, those who suffered more than
$25,000 of economic lossses from auto accidents incurred average total
losses of $76,341, but received on the average $21,641 in compensation
from all sources."
If it is argued that the remote chances of catastrophic accidental loss
for any given insured explains the lack of casualty insurers' efforts in
exciting their insureds' interest in coverage for such loss, why do casu-
alty insurers try to increase their insureds' liability coverage up to, say,
9. Id. at 707 (footnotes omitted).
10. Even first-party uninsured motorist coverage is tied to the tort liability of the uninsured
motorist.
11. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE Acci-
DENT INJURIES 277-78 (Table 31 FS) (1970). The $21,641 in benefits consisted of $3,742 in tort
recoveries and $17,899 from other sources such as health insurance. Id.
[Vol. 58:55
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limits of $100,000 or even more (often selling $1,000,000 umbrella poli-
cies)? Because casualty insurers can market coverage for such remote
liability to others, why should they not interest themselves in marketing
similarly remote-but essential-coverage for their customers own
losses?
B. Insureds' Objections
There could be concerns about the conscionability of a contract by
which a potential accident victim, before any accident, assigns his en-
tire personal injury claim in return for first-party no-fault insurance
benefits. 2 Unquestionably, some, but probably not many,' 3 insureds
would be better off retaining their third-party tort actions rather than
receiving first-party no-fault benefits-for example, an accident victim
free from any blame, who is injured by an obvious tortfeasor and suf-
fers relatively little out-of-pocket loss but large amounts of pain and
suffering. It may well be that such an example will form the basis of a
test case challenging the validity of a first-party no-fault insurance pro-
gram.
To forestall this objection, however, the program could be amended
to allow the insured (or his survivors, in the event of his death) to turn
down the no-fault benefits after the accident in return for retaining the
tort action. In other words, after the accident the no-fault insurer
would offer the insured (or his survivors) the no-fault benefits, but the
potential beneficiary could reject them if he has sufficient confidence in
his tort recovery that he would rather pursue it.
This option raises the possibility of adverse selection,' 4 but given the
marked preference of most people for certainty of benefits over the
risks of a tort suit, most people--even those with good chances of a tort
recovery-probably would prefer immediate, certain no-fault benefits
to an uncertain, dilatory tort recovery. The results of a 1978 Michigan
Insurance Bureau survey of Michigan residents on no-fault auto insur-
ance are illustrative.
A key component of no-fault insurance is the compromise whereby the
right to sue for pain and suffering injuries is limited in return for full
payment of all economic loss. To test the consumer's acceptance to this
compromise, people were asked to respond to the following statement:
To provide more money for medical and wage loss benefits, the right
12. O'Connell, supra note 1, at 707-08.
13. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
14. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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to sue for pain and suffering resulting from an injury which is not per-
manent should be limited.
Since this statement capsulizes the no-fault compromise, the survey
shows support for Michigan no-fault. The responses are summarized as
follows:
Strongly Agree 27.6%
Agreed 51.1%
Neither Agree nor Disagree 11.9%
or Don't Know
Disagree 6.0%
Strongly Disagree 3.5%
The public supports the basic compromise of Michigan no-fault by an
overwhelming margin 78.9% to 9.5%.
An alternative way of testing the support for the no-fault compromise is
to ask whether or not individuals are personally willing to sacrifice their
own right to sue for pain and suffering in return for full payment of eco-
nomic loss. In order to test this attitude, the Insurance Bureau asked the
following question:
Would you give up the right to sue for pain and suffering in all cases
but the most serious, in return for prompt, complete payment of all
medical bills and your lost wages?
A willingness on the part of individuals to give up their own right to
sue for pain and suffering would reflect support for Michigan no-fault.
The following list of responses show that people were supportive of the
no-fault compromise and would give up their own right to sue:
Yes 53.1%
Don't Know 28.9%
No 18.0%
The responses to both questions show that people do not support
the tort system as an effective means of providing accident reparations
and that no-fault is clearly preferred.I5
The device of offering the insured (or his survivors) a post-accident
option of accepting or rejecting no-fault benefits, therefore, would
greatly lessen any objection that the insured has been disadvantaged by
his agreement to receive no-fault benefits.
This freedom to reject no-fault benefits might incline a no-fault in-
surer to offer only no-fault benefits without offering to pay any eco-
nomic losses that exceed the no-fault level, because an insured (or his
15. INSURANCE BUREAU, MICHIGAN DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NO-FAULT INSURANCE IN MICH-
IGAN: CONSUMER ATTITUDES AND PERFORMANCE 16-17 (1978).
[Vol. 58:55
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss1/6
ELECTIVE FIRST-PARTY NO-FAULT INSURANCE
survivor) who, by his own choice, accepts no-fault's certain benefits in
preference to the uncertainties of a tort action arguably need not be
protected from recovering less for his economic loss under no-fault
than under tort. In this way, the uncertainty faced by an insurer in
allowing post-accident elections by insureds is counterbalanced by the
insurer's having to pay only no-fault benefits without any addition of
contingent benefits for economic losses above no-fault limits.
Even those insureds who refuse no-fault benefits would benefit
greatly by the proposed first-party scheme. An insured who has been
offered a sum certain under no-fault would be in a strong position to
demand that his tort lawyer charge a contingent fee only on the excess
of the tort recovery over the offer of the no-fault insurer. Furthermore,
if the no-fault insurer's offer includes not only the no-fault limits, but
also the economic losses recoverable from the tortfeasor, without any
deductions for attorney's fees, then the plaintiff's lawyer should take his
contingency only on the pain-and-suffering element of the awarded
damages. Indeed, many personal injury lawyers might find pursuit of a
tort action on this basis to be not worth the effort. At first blush, this
result might seem to disadvantage the no-fault insured by sending him
back to the no-fault benefits that he prefers to reject in favor of his tort
rights; in fact, however, it is an indication of the relative value of the
right to no-fault benefits over the uncertainties of a tort action.
C. Legal Barriers
Even with the inclusion of a post-accident choice for the no-fault
insured into the first-party proposal, there remains the problem of
whether an insured (or his survivors) can assign the entire tort claim to
a no-fault insurer; i e., the problem of whether common-law or statu-
tory restrictions on transfer of personal injury claims would impede
implementation of first-party no-fault insurance accompanied by trans-
fer of the insured's tort claim.
At common law choses in action generally were nonassignable and
nondevisable. Many states have preserved the common-law rule
prohibiting assignment of personal injury claims and a few have codi-
fied it. 6 The retention of this rule has acted as an impediment to de-
velopments in various areas of the law. Modem events have outpaced
16. New York, California, Georgia, Virginia, and West Virginia statutorily prohibit assign-
ment of personal injury claims. For a survey of state laws regarding assignment of personal injury
claims, see Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500 (1955).
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the circumstances that led to the development of the common-law pro-
hibition of assignment of personal injury claims. Nevertheless, modem
courts and legislatures sometimes blindly perpetuate the common-law
rule.
In his great treatise on English legal history, Holdsworth discussed
the development of the law of assignment. He posited that the origins
of the nonassignability of choses in action lay in the personal nature of
the incident giving rise to a cause of action.' 7 Because choses in action
in both contract and tort arise from matters purely personal to the par-
ties involved, common lawyers regarded assignment of such rights as
"unthinkable."' 8 The conceptual basis for this attitude is somewhat
difficult for us to grasp today, because it apparently proceeds from the
same world view that required livery of seisin-the actual handing over
from vendor to purchaser of a clod of earth-to effectuate transfer of
title to land. '9 Just as medieval lawyers did not separate the concept of
title from the physical transmission of possession (albeit symbolic pos-
session), they did not separate the idea of a claim for damages from the
physical being of the injured claimant. Thus, if A struck and injured B,
B had a right to recover the costs of his injury from A. But C, a third
person, could not purchase this right from B because the right adhered
to B and dissipated when C attempted to seize it.20 Another barrier to
assignability of such an unliquidated claim for damages was its indefi-
nite value. As stated in one American case: "Until [value] is. . .es-
tablished, [the claim] has no elements of property sufficient to make it
the subject of a grant or assignment."'"
Holdsworth also noted that nonassignability of tort claims com-
ported with the medieval desire to discourage maintenance. 22 Mainte-
nance has been defined as "an officious intermeddling in a suit that in
no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party with
money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it."' 23 It is, of course, con-
17. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 520 (3d ed. 1926).
18. Id.
19. See 3 T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 78-79 (1906). Actually, the term
"chose in action," containing the French word "chose," meaning "thing," had long been under-
stood by lawyers to include both tangible and intangible subjects. Thus, the law's distinction
between abstract and concrete "choses"-with the latter transferable but the former not-was and
is arguably inconsistent.
20. See id. at 77.
21. Rice v. Stone, 83 Mass. (I Allen) 566, 570 (1861).
22. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 520-21 n.5.
23. 14 C.J.S. Champerty & Maintenance § l(b) (1939). Champerty, unlike maintenance, in-
volves an element of compensation to the champertor--or purchaser of the claim-from the pro-
[Vol. 58:55
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sistent with both theories that rights of action could be released to the
person against whom the right of action existed, because release would
both obviate the need for litigation and leave the matter personal be-
tween the original parties.24 Holdsworth further contended that the de-
sire to discourage maintenance caused "choses in action real"
(primarily rights of entry) to be nonassignable" As with personal in-
jury claims, the idea that such rights were personal probably contrib-
uted to their nonassignability.2 6 Holdsworth theorized that although
the primary reason for the nonassignability of personal injury claims
was their personal nature, the desire to discourage maintenance was the
moving factor behind nonassignability of choses in action real. When
the distinction between real and personal choses of action blurred, the
differing policy reasons for the nonassignability of such rights disap-
peared, and the idea that assignment of all choses in action must be
prohibited to discourage maintenance became established. 7 Wrote
Holdsworth:
[N]o relaxation has ever been suggested in the rule that a right of action
for unliquidated damages for a tort to property or to the person is unas-
signable. Such claims were not debts; and they were both too uncertain
and too personal to [allow of the exceptions to the rule which developed
in the areas of contractual and other proprietary rights].2"
ceeds of the litigation. Sampliner v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 255 F. 242, 247 (2d Cir. 1918).
Champerty has been termed an aggravated form of maintenance. 14 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 1711 (3d ed. 1972). Both champerty and maintenance are distinguishable from barratry.
See note 125 infra. For further discussion of these terms, see notes 124-28 infra and accompany-
ing text.
24. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 525.
25. Id. at 524-25.
26. Id. at 525.
27. Id. at 526-27, 532.
28. Id. at 537. One long-acknowledged exception to this rule is in the area of proprietary
rights. Courts have long permitted insurers to be subrogated to the property damage claims of
their insureds. "An automobile collision insurer, after indemnifying its insured, is entitled to sub-
rogation against the wrongdoer or tortfeasor who is legally responsible for the harm caused the
insured." 16 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 61:233 (2d ed. 1966) (footnote omit-
ted). This right of subrogation arises regardless of whether a personal injury claim is pending.
"When an insurer indemnifies the insured for the property loss sustained in a collision, it is subro-
gated to the insured's claim with respect to such loss, although the insured also sustained personal
injuries." Id. § 61:234 (footnotes omitted).
As early as 1892, the South Carolina Supreme Court pronounced that the insurer's right to
subrogation in a property insurance case was not dependent on the existence of an express subro-
gation clause in the insurance policy, "for the right of subrogation rests upon well-settled general
principles, and need not, therefore, be the subject of special contract," Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. Sun Fire
Office, 36 S.C. 213, 267, 15 S.E. 562, 582 (1892). See also R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE
LAW § 3.10(a) (1971); note 35 infra and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, a rule developed that the fruits of the action in tort, "if
and when recovered, are assignable. '2 9 In addition, the "bare right of
action,"30 when concretely identified and validated by a judgment, be-
came a property right and, in turn, assignable.31
Present laws regarding assignment of personal injury claims origi-
nate from this historical basis,32 but courts have strained for centuries
to escape the inequities generated by this archaic rule. One exception
to the common-law rule against assignment was an outgrowth of rules
permitting survival of personal injury tort actions to allow assignment
of such rights of action before death.33
The Michigan Supreme Court in 1869 interpreted an 1863 Michigan
survival statute to permit "the assignee of any bond, note or other chose
in action, to sue and recover the same in his own name" in an action for
conversion.34 Although the court held that the survival statute did not
change the general rule against the assignability of an action in tort, it
found that the rule continued to apply
only to those torts which are merely personal, and which, on the death of
the person wronged, die with him; while torts for taking and converting
personal property, or for injury to one's estate, and generally all such
rights of action for tort as would survive to the personal representatives,
may, it seems, be assigned so as to pass an interest to the assignee which
he can enforce by suit at law.35
The Michigan legislature amended the statute in 1897 to permit sur-
vival of actions for "negligent injuries to persons. 36 In 1970 a Michi-
gan Court of Appeals, in Cty of Detroit v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 37
reiterated the link between assignability and survivability: "[I]f the ac-
tion survives the chose is assignable. It is generally held that the enact-
29. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 534 (citing Glegg v. Bromley, [1912] 3 K.B. 474).
30. Glegg v. Bromley, f1912] 3 K.B. 474, 490.
31. See T. STREET, supra note 19, at 76-89.
32. North Chicago St. R.R. v. Ackley, 171 Ill. 100, 111, 49 N.E. 222, 226 (1897).
33. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 584.
34. Final v. Backus, 18 Mich. 218, 231 (1869). In addition to outmoded concepts concerning
the inalienability of intangibles, see notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text, theological consid-
erations equally jarring to modem ears perhaps led to the rule against survival of actions. The
Michigan Supreme Court in 1867, in denying recovery for accidental death, stated, "To the culti-
vated and enlightened mind, looking at human life in the light of the Christian religion as sacred,
the idea of compensating its loss in money is revolting." Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 192
(1867).
35. 18 Mich. at 231.
36. 1897 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 148, § 5 (current version at MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2921
(1980)).
37. 28 Mich. App. 54, 184 N.W.2d 278 (1970).
[Vol. 58:55
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ment of statutes providing for survival of such actions operates
incidentally to remove the restriction on [inter vivos] assignability."38
The court observed that even under the older, less broadly worded stat-
ute, a chose in action in tort for personal injuries would survive and,
therefore, would be generally assignable.3 9
In states that restrict the applicability of survival statutes, courts have
developed other means to circumscribe the effects of the nonassignabil-
ity rule. Although the New York and California survival statutes ex-
pressly prohibit assignability of personal injury claims,40 courts in both
states have attempted, with varying success, to avoid the absolute pro-
hibition of transfer of personal injury claims.
Article 13, section 101 of the New York General Obligations Laws
states that any claim or demand can be transferred except:
1. Where it is to recover damages for a personal injury; [and]
3. Where a transfer thereof ... would contravene public policy.41
Section 13-101 is a codification of the New York common law as settled
in 1837 by Stanton v. Tioga Common Pleas.42 The 1882 case of Wil-
liams v. Ingersoll,43 however, provided a rationale by which New York
courts have often managed to nullify the impact of the statutory prohi-
bition. In Williams the New York Court of Appeals held valid a con-
tract giving an attorney a lien on the proceeds of litigation in a personal
injury suit. The attorney, who had represented his client in several ac-
38. Id. at 59 n.5, 184 N.W.2d at 281 n.5.
39. Id See notes 106-11 infra and accompanying text. See also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 5525 (Vernon 1958). The Texas courts have consistently construed this statute to render per-
sonal injury claims assignable. The cases typically involve assignment of claims to attorneys. See,
e.g., Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Ginther, 96 Tex. 295, 72 S.W. 166 (1903); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v.
Miller, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 609, 53 S.W. 709 (1899). Texas continues to recognize the connection
between assignability and survivability of claims. See Harding v. National Bank, 387 S.W.2d 768
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
40. CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (Deering 1974); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 13-101 (McKinney
1978). See also NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.100(3) (1973).
41. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 13-101 (McKinney 1978). The public policy referred to, id.
§ 13-101(3), is not the policy that prohibits champerty and maintenance. The common-law ration-
ale underlying the express prohibition of assignment of personal injury claims, id. § 13-101(1),
and the explicit statutory ban on champertous transactions, N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 488, 489 (McKin-
ney 1968), render this construction of § 13-101(3) improbable because the provision would then
become superfluous. Courts have construed this provision to apply instead, for example, to the
historical policy invalidating assignment by public officers of unearned salary. DiLallo v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co., 355 F. Supp. 519, 522 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (citing Bowery Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 122
N.Y. 478, 25 N.E. 855 (1890)).
42. 19 Wend. 73 (N.Y. 1837).
43. 89 N.Y. 508 (1882).
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tions against different defendants, asserted a claim for the compensa-
tion due him from the various suits." The court defined the lien in
terms of an assignment of the judgment, rather than in terms of a tradi-
tional attorney's lien. Then, despite the legal prohibition of assignment
of personal injury claims, the court upheld the lien as an equitable as-
signment of the proceeds of the litigation:
Every assignment of a chose in action is merely an executory contract
which equity considers as executed, and which the law following equity
regards as conferring certain rights which the assignor is bound to respect.
If a contract to assign be good in itself and not inconsistent with public
policy, it will take effect as an equitable assignment.45
The court held that the agreement did not violate public policy because
its terms were fair:
The assignment here could not even in equity operate upon the unliqui-
dated claim for damages on account of the personal tort, but attached to
the award the moment it was made. The damages had been suffered. An
action had been commenced for their recovery, and hence the award had
a potential existence and was not ever a mere possibility.46
New York courts have consistently followed Williams.47 In Gross-
man v. Schlosser,4" a 1963 case, plaintiff brought action to enforce an
assignment by defendant of the proceeds of a pending personal injury
suit and to impress a lien on the proceeds in favor of plaintiff-assignee.
The trial court held the assignment invalid as a violation of what is
now section 13-101(l). 49 The appellate division reversed, citing Wil-
liams, but indicated its displeasure in having to do so:
We note. . . our reluctance to adhere to the principle of stare dec/sis in
order to follow the decision in Williams-a decision which established an
obvious anomaly, namely: that a person cannot transfer his cause of ac-
tion but may transfer its potential proceeds, thereby allowing him to do
by indirection what the common law and the statute expressly forbid.
The distinction made is based on form rather than substance; it is devoid
of all reality; in practical effect it fosters one of the very evils which both
44. The court refused to allow the attorney a lien on the proceeds in one of the actions as
compensation for his service in all the actions because an attorney's lien "is confined to the judg-
ment in the very action in which the compensation was earned for which the lien is claimed." Id.
at 517. "When. . . an attorney has several actions, and recovers judgment in but one of them, he
cannot, in the absence of a special agreement, have a lien upon that judgment for his compensa-
tion in all the actions." Id.
45. Id. at 519.
46. Id.
47. See notes 48-61 infra and accompanying text.
48. 19 A.D.2d 893, 244 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1963).
49. 39 Misc. 2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1963). See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
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the common law and the statute sought to avoid, namely: champerty and
maintenance in personal injury actions."
Nevertheless, the court swallowed its distaste and upheld the assign-
ment.
Perhaps it is no surprise, therefore, that New York courts require
strict adherence to the letter of the Williams formula to achieve a valid
transfer. In McCormack v. Bloomfield Steamsho Co.52 a seaman, in-
jured while serving on a vessel, attempted to assign any potential third-
party claims to plaintiff as attorney for the insurance company that
paid the seaman's benefits. The federal district court, applying New
York law, held the assignment invalid under section 13-101(1), because
its express terms indicated it was an attempt to assign the cause of ac-
tion itself rather than the proceeds of the claim when reduced to judg-
ment. 3
Another method by which New York courts avoid the ill effects of
the anti-assignment statute is by distinguishing subrogation from as-
signment.5 4 "Subrogation is not a transfer of a cause of action. The
cause of action still belongs to the [injured insureds], but plaintiff, hav-
ing paid part of their claim under compulsion of its insurance contract,
is entitled, pro tanto, to stand in their place."55 New York courts thus
recognize subrogation as a means of validating transfers of personal
injury claims despite the seemingly absolute injunction of the statute.
It is worthy of note that Grossman56 identified champerty and main-
tenance as the evils that prohibition of assignability of personal injury
50. 19 A.D.2d at 894, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 751. See also Miller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 29
A.D.2d 982, 289 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1968) (trust receipts held to be valid assignment of proceeds of
personal injury cause of action).
51. The utility of Williams, notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text, as precedent for first-
party elective no-fault insurance with pre-tort transfer of third-party tort claims, is limited, how-
ever, because the New York cases that follow the reasoning of Williams seem to preclude assign-
ment of a claim before the commission of the tort and occurrence of injuries. The Williams court,
in defining a rationale for permitting assignment of the proceeds of a personal injury claim,
stressed that the party had suffered damages, and consequently, the award "was not ever a mere
possibility." 89 N.Y. at 519. See notes 46 supra, 101-04 infra and accompanying text.
52. 399 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Finnerty v. Consolidated Tel. & Elec. Subway
Co., 82 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
53. 399 F. Supp. at 490. The court also invalidated the assignment on the alternative ground
that it violated public policy. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 13-101(3) (McKinney 1978), supra
note 41 and accompanying text. The court found the assignment to be an attempt to avoid an
arbitration agreement. 399 F. Supp. at 491.
54. See General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Zerbe Constr. Co., 269 N.Y. 227, 199 N.E.
89 (1935).
55. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Perricone, 54 A.D.2d 975, 975,388 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (1976).
56. 19 A.D.2d 893, 244 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1963); see note 48 supra and accompanying text.
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claims was designed to alleviate .5  The need for section 13-101(1) as a
preventive device against champerty and maintenance is questionable,
even if the statute were strictly enforced, because another statute specif-
ically addresses these abuses:
[N]o corporation or association. . shall solicit, buy or take an assign-
ment of, or be in any manner interested in buying or taking an assign-
ment of a bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or other
thing in action, or any claim or demand, with the intent and for the pur-
pose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon .... 58
New York courts have found the determinative element to be intent.
According to the Court of Appeals, if the intent to sue is an "incidental
and contingent" part of a substantial commercial transaction, an as-
signment is not in violation of this statute.5 9 "[To fall within the statu-
tory prohibition, the assignment must be made for the very purpose of
bringing suit and this implies an exclusion of any other purpose. 60
Thus, ample means exist to prevent or punish champertous assignments
in New York. The statute purporting to prohibit transfer of personal
injury-claims serves only to stultify the growth of cohesive insurance
doctrines. It is otherwise superfluous. 6'
California's courts, like New York's, have struggled to free them-
selves from a statutory restriction on assignability of personal injury
claims. Before 1961 California's survival statute expressly provided for
the survival of personal injury causes of action, but then declared:
"Nothing in this article shall be construed as making such a thing in
action assignable. ' 62 The legislature amended this statute in 1961, but
retained the ban: "Nothing in this section shall be construed as making
assignable things in action which are of such a nature as not to have
been assignable prior to the enactment of the 1961 amendment to this
section."63 The California Supreme Court has indicated that, in light
of other statutes that expressly permit subrogation in particular cases, 64
57. 19 A.D.2d at 894, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
58. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 1968).
59. Sprung v. Jaffe, 3 N.Y.2d 539, 544, 147 N.E.2d 6, 9, 169 N.Y.S,2d 456, 460 (1957).
60. Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 28 N.Y.2d 325, 330, 270 N.E.2d 691,
693, 321 N.Y.S.2d 857, 860 (1971).
61. The purpose of first party no-fault with transfer of tort claims is to pay accident victims
expeditiously; thus, arguably, it is not champerty. See notes 124-32 infra and accompanying text.
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 956 (West 1954) (repealed 1961); 1949 Cal. Stats. ch. 1380, § 2 (re-
pealed 1961).
63. CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (Deering 1974).
64. Subrogation is expressly permitted, for example, under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage
statute. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(g) (Deering 1977).
[Vol. 58:55
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss1/6
ELECTIVE FIRST-PARTY NO-FAULT INSURANCE
the legislature intended the survival statute to prohibit subrogation as
well as assignment in personal injury cases.65 But a series of cases aris-
ing from the California Supreme Court's ban on subrogation illustrates
California's attempt to wrestle free of the codified common-law rule.
In 1960 the California Supreme Court announced its inflexible con-
struction of legislative intent in Ffeld Manor v. Finston.6 6 Plaintiff in
Ffteld was a nursing home that had contracted with Ross to care for
him for life. Ross was hit by a car negligently driven by Finston and
died six weeks later of the resulting injuries. Plaintiff provided Ross
with medical services pursuant to the contract and brought suit against
Finston, asserting both conventional and legal subrogation rights. 67
The court upheld defendant's argument that subrogation, either by the
express terms of the contract or by equitable principles, would operate
as an equitable assignment68 in violation of the anti-assignment statute.
The ban on assignments included subrogation, ruled the court, because
"[t]he Legislature where it has desired to give a right of subrogation in
such cases, has done so in express language."69 The Court based its
decision in part on its understanding that the difference between as-
signment and subrogation is purely technical: "[Elach operates to
transfer from one person to another a cause of action against a third,
and the reasons of policy which make certain causes of action nonas-
signable would seem to operate as forcefully against the transfer of
such causes of action by subrogation."70
The first criticism of Fofteld came in 1963 in Peller v. Liberty Mutual
Fire Insurance Co.7" A California District Court of Appeals, though
following F/feld and invalidating a subrogation clause for medical cov-
erage in an automobile insurance policy, stated:
A persuasive argument can be made that the reasons for holding the
common law rule that choses in action for personal injuries arising in tort
are unassignable, are obsolete and no longer applicable to reimbursement
of medical and hospital expenses. These special damages, unlike general
damages, are certain, or can be made certain, for the purposes of subroga-
65. Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 639-40, 354 P.2d 1073, 1077, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377,
381 (1960). Two years later, in Bilyeu v. State Employees' Retirement Sys., 58 Cal. 2d 618, 624,
375 P.2d 442, 446, 25 Cal. Rptr. 562, 566 (1962), the court expressly affirmed this construction.
66. 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1960).
67. Conventional subrogation is an express contractual right; legal or equitable subrogation
arises by operation of law. R. KEETON, supra note 28, § 3.10(a).
68. 54 Cal. 2d at 638, 354 P.2d at 1076-77, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81.
69. Id. at 639, 354 P.2d at 1077, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
70. Id. at 640, 354 P.2d at 1078, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
71. 220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1963).
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tion. It is particularly significant that protection against fortuitous losses
by indemnity insurance was unknown when this common law rule
evolved, while today such insurance serves a beneficial social and eco-
72nomic purpose.
Acknowledging the power and obligation of courts to overrule anach-
ronistic laws, the court nevertheless felt constrained to deny subroga-
tion because-as was emphasized in Foteld-the law at issue derived
from the legislature, not from the common law.73
In 1966 another California District Court of Appeals wrote what has
emerged as a seminal decision upholding subrogation. Block v. Calf/or-
nia Physicians' Service (CPS7 4 involved a group-health contract under
which CPS agreed to furnish medical and hospital payments to its
members. The relevant clause of the contract provided CPS with a
right of reimbursement to the extent of its payments and also granted
CPS an equitable lien to the extent of these payments on any recovery a
member might receive. The court ruled Ffeld inapplicable because
there was no transfer of a personal injury cause of action." The court
reasoned that the agreement did not require CPS to be subrogated to
the member's cause of action, nor did it require the member to enforce
his claim against the tortfeasor. In addition, the agreement did not per-
mit CPS to sue the tortfeasor in its own right. Thus, "if no claim is
made or suit is filed against the tortfeasor and no recovery is effected
there would be no lien."76 The court also noted at length that CPS was
not an insurance company, but an association organized to "provide
medical and hospital services on a nonprofit basis at a minimum ex-
pense to those participating."77 Because CPS did not assume a risk in
exchange for the payment of premiums, but merely distributed funds
among its members,78 the court found the reimbursement clause to be
72. Id. at 611, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
73. 54 Cal. 2d at 639, 354 P.2d at 1079, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
74. 244 Cal. App. 2d 266, 53 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1966).
75. Id. at 270-71, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
76. Id. at 272, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
77. Id. at 273, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
78. Id. at 269-70, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 53. In 1946 the California Supreme Court ruled in a
declaratory judgment action that CPS was not in the insurance business. California Physicians'
Serv. v. Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 172 P.2d 4 (1946). The California Insurance Commissioner had
appealed a similar finding by a lower court, arguing that the nature of the services provided by
CPS was indistinguishable from medical insurance, and that the Service, therefore, should be
subject to regulation under the state's insurance laws. In holding that the Insurance Commis-
sioner could not subject CPS to regulation, the court took notice of the "great social need for
adequate medical benefits at a cost which the average wage earner can afford to pay." Id. at 801,
172 P.2d at 11. The court analyzed the structure of payment to and benefits provided by CPS and
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"part of an over-all program sanctioned and encouraged by the Legis-
lature and designed by defendant Service to provide [medical services
to the indigent]. By becoming a member of the plan under a Group
Health Service agreement plaintiff has voluntarily associated himself
with the public policy of this state. ' 79 The court thus concluded that it
would be unfair for plaintiff to receive a double recovery at the expense
of the association.
80
The court's studied effort to distinguish CPS from an insurance com-
pany evidently arises from the rationale underlying the collateral-
source rule in torts.8' This rule, of course, prohibits reduction of a
damages award by the amount received from the injured party's own
insurance. The rule thus prevents the tortfeasor from receiving a wind-
fall by virtue of the victim's foresight in securing insurance. Because
the insured has paid for his coverage, his insurance benefits are irrele-
vant to compensation due him by the tortfeasor82 An arguable corol-
lary to the collateral-source rule is the prohibition of subrogation by
insurance companies. The reasoning assumes that because insurers
charge premiums for accepting the risks of coverage, subrogation
would result in a kind of double recovery. 3 In Block the court took
pains to show that CPS was not paid to assume risks and, therefore,
should be entitled to subrogation. The court's rationale seems to have
grown from a policy concern against double recovery.
Thus Ffeld, which equated assignment with subrogation and for-
bade both, led the Block court to isolate a technical difference between
the CPS insurance system and typical insurance to permit subrogation
determined that CPS was merely an agent for its member beneficiaries and doctors, and that the
corporation itself did not assume risk of loss from, or shift loss among, the beneficiaries.
The court applied a second test in making its decision: "The question. . . is whether, looking
at the plan of operation as a whole, 'service' rather than 'indemnity' is its principal object and
purpose." Id. at 809, 172 P.2d at 16. The court held that CPS's low-cost medical services met a
substantial social need, and constituted "service," not "indemnity." The court added that the
statutory provision, CAL. CIv. CODE § 593a (West 1961) (regulation of nonprofit professional or-
ganizations by attorney general and professional board), indicated a legislative intent that such
organizations be exempt from regulation by the Insurance Commissioner. In sum, the California
Supreme Court's holding seems to be not so concerned with risk-shifting as with finding a means
by which CPS need not be regulated in the same way as ordinary insurance companies.
79. 244 Cal. App. 2d at 273, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
80. Id.
81. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1343 (1956).
82. Silinsky v. State-Wide Ins. Co., 30 A.D.2d 1, 4, 289 N.Y.S.2d 541, 546 (1968).
83. See Lee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 57 Cal. App. 3d 458, 129 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1976)
(Friedman, J., concurring).
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under another name. The result effectively permitted subrogation de-
spite the decision of the California Supreme Court in Fofeld.
The distinction urged by the Block court as the basis for permitting
subrogation for CPS was later ignored in West v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. 4 In West a subrogation clause expressly
provided that the insurance company be subrogated to the extent of
benefits paid, that the insured agreed to take all action necessary to
enforce his rights against a tortfeasor, and that the insured agreed to do
nothing to prejudice the rights of the subrogee. The district court of
appeals distinguished Ffeld and Peller and upheld the clause because
it did not permit the insurer to bring suit in its own name."- The court
cited Block as authority for the proposition that:
[A]n agreement to reimburse an insurer in the event of recovery of such
damages by an insured from a third party tortfeasor by either judgment
or settlement is valid and there is no legal prohibition against an insurer
requiring its insured to provide it with a lien to the extent of benefits paid
under the policy against any recovery by the insured from a third party.8 6
The court emphasized that subrogation was to the proceeds of the ac-
tion, not to the cause of action. Subrogation rights arise only after the
proceeds are in existence.8 7
Lee v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co."8 considered the
same subrogation clause and followed the West decision in what the
concurring judge declared to be an "erosion" of the Ffleld rule. 9 The
court reasoned that under California's collateral source rule the insured
would receive compensation from both the tortfeasor and the insurer,
and that this would constitute the form of double recovery declared
unfair in Block.90
84. 30 Cal. App. 3d 562, 106 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1973).
85. Id. at 565, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
86. Id.
87. This concept of subrogation to the proceeds of a claim-similar to the so-called "trust
receipt" theory-is the same device used by the New York Court of Appeals in Williams v. Inger-
soll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882), to permit assignment of personal injury claims. See notes 4346 mra,
note 96 infra and accompanying text.
88. 57 Cal. App. 3d 458, 129 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1976).
89. Id. at 469, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 278 (Friedman, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 465, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 275. Theoretically, the concept of double recovery is, in some
measure, illusory. Insurance companies should consider state subrogation laws as one factor in
determining premium rates. If subrogation is allowed, then premiums will be lower, and vice
versa. Therefore, if the victim receives payment from both the insurance company and the
tortfeasor in a nonsubrogation state, the insurance company in theory has been previously reim-
bursed through higher premiums, and the insured has already paid for his double recovery. This
theory, however, does not solve the problem of discouraging victims, in cooperation with their
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Thus, Ffield has been effectively circumvented to permit reimburse-
ment of insurers to the extent of medical benefits paid. The California
courts, which have gradually expanded what is in essence a right of
subrogation, have been careful to indicate that assignments and subro-
gation in personal injury cases are invalid except as permitted by stat-
ute. The end result of attempts to achieve the intent of the legislature,
however, bowing to modern insurance needs, is that subrogation is tac-
itly allowed in California. The judicial ingenuity that has been re-
quired to reach this pragmatic result highlights the need for a
reappraisal of the whole doctrine of prohibition of assignment of per-
sonal injury claims.
Illinois is one of the states that prohibits assignment of personal in-
jury claims by common-law decision,9' yet permits subrogation by dis-
tinguishing it from assignment. In the 1965 case of Damhesel v.
Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. ,92 the court upheld a sub-
rogation clause under automobile medical insurance payments cover-
age (med-pay) even though the injured party received no payment
from his insurer. Plaintiff was a passenger in a car insured by defend-
ant for $500 of medical expenses for each passenger. Damhesel, the
nonnegligent party in a collision, settled his personal injury claim with
the negligent driver of the other car. He executed a general release and
then sued the defendant-insurer for recovery under its med-pay policy
with the host-driver. A clause in the policy provided that the insurer be
subrogated to the rights of the injured party, and that the injured party
should "do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights." An Illinois ap-
pellate court held that by executing a general release, plaintiff had
prejudiced the insurer's rights and, therefore, could not recover. The
court noted:
It is clear that the subrogation clause of the policy before us does not
constitute an assignment of a personal tort. As was said in Remsen v.
Midway Liquors, Inc., 30 Ill. App.2d 132, 143, 174 N.E.2d 7, 12 (1961):
"Subrogation presupposes an actual payment and satisfaction of the debt
or claim to which the party is subrogated, although the remedy is kept
alive in equity for the benefit of the one who made the payment under
lawyers and doctors, from running up excessive medical bills in the expectation of profit from
multiple payment; nor does it address the problem of the costs of invoking subrogation rights; ie.,
litigation costs may be so great as to nullify the effectiveness of subrogation as a method of reim-
bursement. Furthermore, if insurers do not always act in accordance with theory, the savings, if
any, attributable to subrogation may not necessarily be passed on to insureds.
91. North Chicago St. R.R. v. Ackley, 171 Ill. 100, 49 N.E. 222 (1897).
92. 60 Il. App. 2d 279, 209 N.E.2d 876 (1965).
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circumstances entitling him to contribution or indemnity while assign-
ment necessarily contemplates the continued existence of the debt or
claim assigned. Subrogation operates only to secure contribution and in-
demnity, whereas an assignment transfers the whole claim. . . ." In the
case at bar. . . the insurance company would have paid the amount due
[Damhesel] thus satisfying his claim. The company would then have
sought contribution from [the negligent driver]. .. .
On similar facts in 1965, the court upheld a subrogation clause in
Bernardini v. Home & Automobile Insurance Co.," and thus circum-
vented Illinois' prohibition of assignment of personal injury actions, by
finding a contractual lien on part of the insured's recovery. 95
It also should be emphasized how courts have often strained to by-
pass prohibitions against transfer of personal injury tort claims by use
of, for example, the "trust receipt," by which an insured, in considera-
tion for payment of his first-party claim, promises to hold in trust for
the first-party insurer whatever amount of the first-party benefits he
93. Id. at 281, 209 N.E.2d at 878.
94. 64 Ill. App. 2d 465, 212 N.E.2d 499 (1965).
95. Subrogation operates only to secure contribution and indemnity whereas an assign-
ment transfers the whole claim. In the instant case the medical subrogation clause does
not purport to transfer or assign the entire claim of plaintiffs against the tort-feasor; it
impresses a lien in favor of the insurer to the extent of its payment upon any recovery
obtained by the plaintiffs from the tort-feasor. The subrogation does not deprive the
insured of a recovery for pain and suffering ....
Id. at 467, 212 N.E.2d at 501. Of course, this last sentence indicates that the Illinois court might
have been particularly hostile to transfer of the claimant's whole claim, including pain and suffer-
ing.
In one respect, that the proposal discussed in this article involves assignment rather than subro-
gation may make it more acceptable to the courts. Courts troubled by the split in the cause of
action between the subrogor and subrogee would not face that difficulty if assignment of the entire
cause of action takes place. See Ullam-Morse, Medical Payments Subrogation Agreements. Valid
Provisions in Indemnity Insurance Policies, 7 CAP. U.L. REV. 255 (1977).
But the conclusion to this article suggests-theoretically, at least, and practically, to a large
extent-that there is little reason to validate transfer of only part of a claim. Certainly, a primary
effect of the contingent fee is, in effect, to transfer all or part of the claimant's pain and suffering
claim to his lawyer. Yet, payment of attorneys in personal injury cases by means of contingent
fees has long been an accepted practice. See F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEOAL
SERVICES 14-15, 18 (1964); J. O'CONNELL & R. SIMON, PAYMENT FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING 4-5
(1972). The policy reasons for prohibiting transfer of entire tort claims to lawyers are those under-
lying prohibitions against champerty and maintenance. Id. at 35-38; O'Connell, The Interlocking
Death and Rebirth of Contract and Tort, 75 MICH. L. REV. 659, 682-83 (1977). See generally J.
O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE 37-53 (1971),
also publshed in J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND 120-33
(1975); Donin, England Looks at a Hybrid Contingent Fee System, 64 A.B.A. J. 773 (1978); notes
128-32 infra and accompanying text. These policy considerations, however, have no bearing on
the proposal discussed in this article and should not pose barriers to its implementation.
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may recover from the tortfeasor.96 The common-law ban against as-
signment of personal injury claims, as we have seen, has been vitiated
by other approaches. Michigan97 has adopted a relatively straightfor-
ward approach in tying assignability to survivability. New York98 and
California9 9 courts, although statutorily barred from using Michigan's
approach, have created chameleon-like "rules" that pay lip service to
the statutes but achieve the very results that the statutes try to prevent.
Even apart from the apparent inconsistencies between statutory and
case law in these states, the positions adopted by the New York and
California courts to achieve flexibility in one area seem to deprive them
of that flexibility in meeting new situations. New York's case law, as a
result, appears to cast a cloud, to say the least, on a favorable judicial
reception to pretort assignments.'t° As noted earlier, New York's
courts recognize two exceptions to their general rule prohibiting the
transfer of personal injury claims-assignment of proceeds and subro-
gation.'t ' In defining the assignability-of-proceeds exception, the New
York Court of Appeals in Williams v. Ingersoll1°2 reasoned that an as-
signment operated in equity to give the assignee rights in a claim al-
ready in existence; equity caused the assignment to attach to an award
"the moment it was made."'0 3 In Williams "[t]he damages had been
suffered. An action had been commenced for their recovery, and hence
the award had a potential existence and was not ever a mere possibil-
ity."' °  This reasoning allows the court to circumvent the (now statu-
tory) 0 5 ban on assignability of personal injury claims. Nonetheless, it
arguably presents a barrier to extension of the exception to pretort as-
signment of entire claims.
In contrast to New York, Michigan's approach to the issues of as-
signment and subrogation leaves its courts sufficient flexibility to deal
96. Procaccia, The Effect and Validity of Subrogation Clauses in Insurance Policies, 1973 INs.
L.J. 573, 577. See notes 50, 67 supra and accompanying text. See generally Note, Legal and
Practical Problems Arisingfrom Subrogation Clauses in Health andAccident Policies, 34 MARQ. L.
REV. 256 (1971).
97. See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
98. See notes 41-61 supra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 62-90 supra and accompanying text.
100. Although nonessential to the first-party plan proposed in this article, pretort assignment
may be preferable. See notes 4, 14 supra and accompanying text.
101. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
102. 89 N.Y. 508 (1882).
103. Id. at 519.
104. Id.
105. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 13-101(1) (McKinney 1978).
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with the issue of pretort assignment of an entire personal injury claim.
In Ciy of Detroit v. Bridgeport Brass Co. "6 a bus driver employed by
the city was injured when his bus collided with an automobile driven
by defendant's employee. The bus driver was entitled to and accepted
disability pension benefits from the city, and the city intervened in his
suit against Bridgeport Brass, claiming subrogation rights to the extent
of benefits paid and payable. The city based its claim on a subrogation
provision in its charter and on the charter's requirement that work-re-
lated injuries be compensated by a pension payable upon disablement
in the line of duty. The defense asserted that the city, as a mere volun-
teer, had no subrogation rights, but the court held that the "mere vol-
unteer" doctrine was inapplicable:
An assignment of a contingent unliquidated claim can be made in ad-
vance of the injury giving rise to the claim, at least in a case like this
where the assignee obligates himself to pay a reasonable amount for the
claim. By his acceptance of the pension benefits, [the bus driver] is
deemed to have agreed to thepro tanto assignment or conventional subro-
gation of his rights against third-party tortfeasors provided for in the
city's charter.10 7
The court observed in a footnote that choses in action for personal in-
jury are assignable in Michigan10 8 and did not distinguish between as-
signment and subrogation. Although the opinion is phrased largely in
terms of subrogation, the court-as is evident from the language
quoted-used the term interchangeably with assignment. 0 9 The court
thus had no need to become mired in the distinctions upon which New
York and California courts (and other states such as Illinois) have
106. 28 Mich. App. 54, 184 N.W.2d 278 (1970).
107. Id. at 59-60, 184 N.W.2d at 281.
108. Id. at 59 n.5, 184 N.W.2d at 281 n.5.
109. Assignment operates to transfer an entire property, or the whole of any right or claim in
property. Remsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., 30 I11. App. 2d 132, 144, 174 N.E.2d 7, 12 (1961).
Subrogation, however, involves the payment of a debt or claim by a party, who, by making pay-
ment, becomes entitled in equity to indemnity or contribution from the party orginally liable for
the payment. A subrogation clause in an insurance contract "impresses a lien in favor of the
insurer to the extent of [the insurer's] payment [to the insured]." The lien is impressed upon "any
recovery obtained by the [insured] from the tort-feasor." Bernardini v. Home & Auto. Ins. Co., 64
Ill. App. 2d 465, 467, 212 N.E.2d 499, 501 (1965). See note 94 supra and accompanying text. If
the tortfeasor and the insured effect a settlement prejudicial to the rights of an insurer, the insurer
may have recourse to suit against one of those parties. See R. KEETON, supra note 28, at 158-60.
Michigan's Supreme Court has on occasion distinguished subrogation rights from assignment
rights. See Michigan Medical Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954). This case
considered the subrogor's (the injured insured's) impairment of contractual subrogation rights.
The injured victim had settled with the tortfeasor and thus had destroyed the rights of the medical
service to proceed against the tortfeasor. The court held that the service must proceed against its
[Vol. 58:55
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seized. Michigan's policy of openly allowing assignment thus frees its
courts to encounter new situations unencumbered by suffocating tech-
nicalities.
In fact, the validity of pretort assignment of claims is touched upon
in the Bridgeport Brass decision, although the court's holding rendered
ultimate decision on the point unnecessary. The court stated that "[a]n
assignment of a contingent unliquidated claim can be made in advance
of the injury,""t 0 but this statement becomes dictum in light of the
court's analysis of the facts. The employee's rights may have derived
from either his employment contract (not mentioned by the court) or
his acceptance of disability benefits. If the court had determined that
the agreement to transfer tort rightspro tanto to the city in exchange for
inclusion in the disability pension plan occurred at the time that he
entered into the city's employ, the case would demonstrate an effective
pretort assignment. The court sidestepped this issue by pinpointing the
agreement to transfer tort rights at the time of his acceptance of disabil-
ity payments. The court intimated in a footnote, however, that it was
cognizant of the former alternative, but did not deem this case appro-
priate for resolution of that issue."'
insured and not against the tortfeasor because the service's rights were rights of subrogation, not
of assignment. Id. at 578, 64 N.W.2d at 714.
The Bridgeaport Brass court distinguished Sharpe in a footnote. 28 Mich. App. at 61 n. 11, 184
NW.2d at 282 n.ll.
110. 28 Mich. App. at 59, 184 N.W.2d at 281.
11I. The court stated that its "disposition of this case makes it unnecessary to consider
whether the [contract] was entered into at some earlier time." Id. at 61 n.10, 184 N.W.2d at 282
n. 10. Robert E. Keeton, the country's leading insurance law scholar before joining the federal
bench, chided the courts for rather unthinkingly striking down assignments of potential insurance
claims in a context analogous to the proposal in this article-when the possibilities of abuse seem
greater, but there are corresponding advantages to letting people sell their uncertain rights to
future insurance benefits in return for more certain benefits.
[Clases have arisen in which it might be argued that. . . wagering involving insurance
policies has performed a socially useful function [despite the law's disapproval of it]. For
example, there was a time when industrial life insurance policies [a type written in small
amounts, paid for in weekly modest installments] commonly contained no provision for
cash surrender value. In some communities a business developed of purchasing assign-
ments of these policies. [See, e.g., Hack v. Metz, 173 S.C. 413, 176 S.E. 314 (1935) (hold-
ing the assignment invalid).] It may well be that this was a form... [of] wagering, but
enforcement of such assignments might have served a socially useful purpose in enabling
poverty-stricken holders of industrial life insurance policies to realize something on the
potential value of contracts they might otherwise have allowed to lapse. Provision for
cash surrender value is an alternative way of making it possible for the insured to realize
the value of the contract in the situation. But if the person whose life is insured has
become uninsurable, the value of the contract is much greater than cash surrender value,
and the insured would have no enforceable way of realizing that higher value during his
lifetime if assignments were void.
R. KEETON, supra note 28, § 3.1(b).
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In recent years, courts have begun to free themselves from the stric-
tures of anachronistic statutes. The California Supreme Court, in the
1975 case of Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,112 has taken a step in this direction
by abolishing statutory contributory negligence and replacing it with
judicially created comparative negligence. In Li the contributory negli-
gence rule would have barred all recovery to a badly injured plaintiff-
a much criticized result. In making its ruling, the court noted that the
state legislature had defeated many bills designed to ameliorate this
harsh effect of contributory negligence,' 13 but seemed to feel that de-
spite-or, indeed, because of-legislative inability to effectuate a rem-
edy for this harsh and outmoded doctrine, the court must intervene.
The Li court noted that perpetuation of a notoriously inequitable
doctrine would undermine public confidence in the legal system. "It is
manifest that this state of affairs, viewed from the standpoint of the
health and vitality of the legal process, can only detract from public
confidence in the ability of law and legal institutions to assign liability
on a just and consistent basis."" 4 Thus, "logic, practical experience,
and fundamental justice"'115 overwhelmingly mandated a change.
The court also analyzed the history of California's codification of the
common law and reasoned that the Code clarified, but did not freeze
development of, the common law. "[T]he intention of the Legislature
in enacting [contributory negligencel was to state the basic rule of neg-
ligence together with the defense of contributory negligence modified
by the emerging doctrine of last clear chance." ' 1 6 Accordingly, codifi-
cation did not indicate a legislative intent to "restrict the courts from
further development of these concepts according to evolving standards
of duty, causation, and liability.""' 17
112. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). See also Hoffman v. Jones, 280
So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). The New York Court of Appeals ventured into the area of apportioning
fault in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1973), but
refused to adopt comparative negligence. The court indicated that the area was more appropriate
for legislative action, in spite of its recognition that the contributory negligence rule was also of
judicial origin. Id. at 151, 282 N.E.2d at 293-94, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 389-90. See Codling v. Paglia,
32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973). Michigan's court adopted comparative
negligence in 1977. Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977).
113. 13 Cal. 3d at 810 n.1, 532 P.2d at 1230 n.l, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862 n.l.
114. Id. at 812, 532 P.2d at 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
115. Id., 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
116. Id. at 84, 532 P.2d at 1238, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
117. Id. Finally, the court offered a traditional rationale for its decision, stating that the con-
tributory negligence statute itself had been previously misconstrued and should be read as a com-
parative negligence statute. Id.
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has recognized that
statutes dealing with but not purporting to alter the common law
should not be construed to hinder its development. In Lewis v. Lewis"
the court abolished the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, which
barred negligence suits between husbands and wives. A Massachusetts
statute provided that "[a] married woman may sue and be sued in the
manner as if she were sole, but this section shall not authorize suits
between husband and wife.""' 9 The court, however, rejected the argu-
ment that this statute froze the common-law doctrine of interspousal
immunity, holding instead that the statute "left the rule in its common
law status susceptible to reexamination and alteration by this court."'120
The court also rejected the argument that the age of the doctrine made
it immune to all but legislative authority:
When the rationales which gave meaning and coherence to a judicially
created rule are no longer vital, and the rule itself is not consonant with
the needs of contemporary society, a court not only has the authority but
also the duty to reexamine its precedents rather than to apply by rote an
antiquated formula.12 '
The reasoning of the Massachusetts court is applicable to Califor-
nia's survival statute. The statute provides that "[n]othing in this sec-
tion shall be construed as making assignable things in action which
[were] not . . . assignable [before 196 1]. ' 1122 Thus, the statute should
be construed not to bar assignment necessarily, but rather to leave the
issue in the domain of the courts. A much needed reappraisal of the
anti-assignment common law by the California Supreme Court would
not encroach on legislative turf.
One last policy issue must be clarified. One of the most commonly
cited reasons for perpetuating the anti-assignment ban, as we have
seen, 23 is the fear that champerty and maintenance would be fomented
by its abolition. Apart from realizing that other laws adequately deal
with these problems, 24 it should be stressed that these fears are irrele-
vant to the first-party no-fault plan under discussion. Champerty is
defined as "the aiding of a litigation by a stranger having no interest
. . . on an agreement with the party in interest, whereupon such stran-
118. 370 Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976).
119. Id. at 624, 351 N.E.2d at 529.
120. Id. at 627-28, 351 N.E.2d at 531.
121. Id.
122. CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (Deering 1978); see text accompanying notes 61-90 supra.
123. See notes 50, 57 supra and accompanying text.
124. See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
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ger is to receive a part of the thing in dispute."'' 25
There are two essential elements of a champertous agreement: first,
there must be an undertaking by one person to defray the expense of the
whole or a part of another's suit; second, the agreement or promise on the
part of the latter to divide with the former the proceeds of the litigation in
the event it proves successful.' 26
That champerty is not involved in first-party no-fault insurance is per-
haps best illustrated by the Michigan experience.
In Michigan, where the champerty offense has been generally pro-
nounced "dead," 27 it is retained for lawyers. ' 28 (It would be inapplica-
ble, therefore, to bar transfer of personal injury claims to insurers, as
proposed in this article.) According to the Michigan Supreme Court in
the 1933 case of Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co., 129 the reason for re-
taining the rule against solicitation by lawyers is to discourage "ambu-
lance chasing": 3
The practice [of "ambulance chasing"] has developed recognized evils,
the major of which are, (1) fomenting litigation with resultant burdens on
the courts and public purse, (2) subornation of perjury, (3) mulcting of
innocent persons by judgments, upon manufactured causes of action and
perjured testimony, and by settlements to buy peace, and (4) defrauding
of injured persons having proper causes of action, but ignorant of legal
125. Worrell v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 144 Okla. 297, 299, 291 P. 47, 48 (1930) (quoting 11
C.J.S. Champery & Maintenance § 38 (1917)).
126. Clark v. Harrison, 182 Ga. 56, 56, 184 S.E. 620, 622 (1935).
127. Grant v. Stecker & Huff, 300 Mich. 174, 1 N.W.2d 500 (1942).
128. In 1918 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled in Exparte McCloskey, 82 Tex.
Crim. 531, 199 S.W. 1101 (1918), aj7'd, 252 U.S. 107 (1920), that a statute making illegal the
soliciting of claims by attorneys or others was constitutional and not in conflict with the law per-
mitting assignment of claims. The statute in particular prohibited barratry, making it "an offense
for any one, by personal solicitation to seek to be employed by another to prosecute or collect any
claim such other may have." Id. at 536, 199 S.W. at 1102. Barratry is the "public policy which
prohibits stirring up litigation. . . . This offense. . . consists in the repeated stirring up of law-
suits and quarrels by one who is a stranger to them. The target [of the statute] is the officious
troublemaker and the essence is repeated action; a single instance of incitement does not constitute
the crime." F. MACKINNON, supra note 95, at 37. The barratry offense at common law was not
specifically directed at lawyers; nevertheless, lawyers convicted of the offense were not only sub-
jected to the penalties assessed upon laymen, but were "disabled from practicing for the future,"
Id. at 54 n.8 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 134-36 (3d ed. 1884)).
The difference between barratry and maintenance is largely historical. According to MacKin-
non, maintenance was a "politically oriented crime," but barratry was related to crimes dealing
with breach of the peace. F. MAcKINNON, supra note 95, at 36-37. MacKinnon attributes the
common-law prohibition of barratry to the English view that "litigation is a social ill, which, like
other disputes and quarrels, should be minimized." Id. at 210. See note 23 supra and accompa-
nying text.
129. 262 Mich. 1, 247 N.W. 97 (1933).
130. Id. at 7, 247 N.W. at 99.
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rights and court procedure, by means of contracts which retain exorbitant
percentages of recovery and illegal charges for court costs and expenses
and by settlements made for quick return of fees and against the just
rights of the injured persons.' 3'
None of these abuses appear to be present in this article's first-party no-
fault proposal. 132 The effect of the proposal would be to assure pay-
ment to injured insureds and to provide private funding for payments
to meet real needs. The benefit to society should outweigh academic
concerns about champerty. Funding of the system by pursuing tort
claims should not be regarded as officiousness because, to the extent of
compensation paid to an injured party, the insurer has a direct interest
in the proceeds of the claim; to the extent of recovery above compensa-
tion paid to an injured party in an individual case, both the insurer and
the public have an interest in the program itself and in making it self-
supporting. The other abuses fostered by champerty, ie., perjury,
manufactured causes of action, and defrauding of persons innocent of
the workings of the legal system, are not really of major concern under
first-party no-fault insurance. Indeed, one purpose of such insurance,
accompanied by assignment of fault-based claims, is to avoid "ambu-
lance chasing" and its attendant evils.
III. CONCLUSION
All the permutations of prohibitions against transfer of personal
claims discussed in this article highlight how inapplicable to first-party
no-fault insurance, with concomitant assignment of third-party tort
claims, are the fears that led to bans on champerty and on other means
of transferring all or parts of personal injury claims. This historical
perspective also shows the courts' long struggle to free themselves from
bans no longer bottomed on contemporary considerations. In recent
years the courts of this country have been ever more innovative in
molding and designing new causes of action for personal injury (most
notably in products liability claims), and yet these innovations have left
us with a horrendously inadequate liability insurance system, especially
as it applies to personal injury. It should not be beyond the power and
imagination of these same courts to approve innovative steps allowing
insurers and insureds to harness that wayward tort system fashioned by
the courts. To guarantee surer, quicker, more efficient payment for ac-
131. Id. at 7-8, 247 N.W. at 99.
132. But see O'Connel, supra note I, at 703-05, adaptedfrom J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at
198-99.
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cidental injuries in this manner is especially feasible in states where the
only purported bans on such schemes stem from common-law restric-
tions, which are not really applicable to first-party no-fault insurance
with assignment of third-party tort claims. Even in states like Califor-
nia and New York, where statutory prohibitions against assignment of
personal injury claims are bottomed on the common law, courts could
uphold first-party no-fault insurance with assignment of third-party
tort claims as consistent with the spirit of those laws. As a California
appellate court admitted:
A persuasive argument can be made that the reasons for holding the
common law rule that choses in action for personal injuries arising in tort
are unassignable, are obsolete and no longer applicable. . . . It is particu-
larly significant that protection against fortuitous losses by ... insurance
was unknown when this common law rule evolved, while today such in-
surance serves a beneficial social and economic purpose. 133
The statutory prohibitions against assignment should be no more
formidable to the California and New York courts than arguably con-
trolling statutory provisions on privity, notice, and disclaimers that
those courts bypassed to formulate the rule of strict product liability.t34
Such innovation was followed throughout the United States by what
Dean Prosser called "the most rapid and altogether spectacular over-
turn of an established rule in the entire history of the law of torts."'135
The time has come to be similarly venturesome in helping to further
advance personal injury law to assure payment for losses.
Professor Guido Calabresi of the Yale Law School recently delivered
an Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School as part
of a three-lecture program entitled "The Common Law in an Age of
Statutes." In the second lecture, subtitled "Toward a Theory of the
Second Look," according to the Harvard Law Record,
Calabresi proposed a judicial solution to the problem of outdated statutes.
He defined his doctrine of the second look as: "Judicial power to change
or nullify statutes in appropriate cases, without the arguable overkill of
133. Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 611, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41, 42 (1963).
Admittedly, the Peller court made reference to the idea that "special damages, unlike general
damages, are certain, or can be made certain, for the purposes of subrogation." fd. See note 71
supra and accompanying text. But the uncertainty concerns the inchoate nature of the thing to be
transferred, a factor with far less modem pertinence than fear of champerty. See notes 127-31
supra and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
135. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liabili y to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791,
793-94 (1966).
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declaring the statute unconstitutional, and thus without precluding a sec-
ond look by the legislature.
He went on to explain the considerations appropriate to the application
of the doctrine. First, the court should act only within the areas of legisla-
tive inertia-the idea is to deal only with laws the legislature, as a practi-
cal matter, can't reach. A court wouldn't be justified in simply looking to
its own views and prejudices in overcoming legislative inertia. It must ask
certain questions, such as: is the statute, because of changes in the world
around it, clearly inadequate today, is the statute philosophically out of
step with newer statutes; has there been an accretion of criticism from
scholars, or a series of events undercutting the statute.
136
Statutory prohibitions against transfer of tort claims would seem op-
portune for a "second look."
Ultimately, however, if reliance on the judiciary to uphold the idea
proposed in this article still looks too risky for an insurer to try without
legislative authorization-and such authorization seems doubtful in
view of the power of the trial bar' 37-the safer course would be for an
insurer to market first-party no-fault with assignment of third-party
claims, but allowing the no-fault insured a choice to pursue either his
no-fault or his tort remedy.'
38
136. Zelanak, Calabresi: "Second Look" May Prevent Choking on Statutes, Harv. L. Rec.,
May 18, 1977, at 5, col. 2 (Calabresi's lectures are scheduled to be published in book form by the
Harvard University Press, G. CALABRESI, THE COMMON LAW FUNCTION IN THE AGE OF STAT-
UTES); see Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of Statutes4ct: A Comment, 4 VT. L. REV. 247 (1979). See
also Bischoff, The Dynamics fTort Law: Court or Legislature?, 4 VT. L. REV. 35 (1979); Gilmore,
The Storrs Lectures: The Age of Anxiety, 84 YALE L.J. 1022, 1042-43 (1975), reprinted in edited
form in G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 94-98 (1977); Keeton, Creative Continuity in
the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463 (1962); Peck, The Role of the Courts andLegislatures in the
Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1963).
137. O'Connell, supra note 1, at 695-97, adaptedfrom J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 158-59.
138. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
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